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what constitutes an implied waiver in the case of a two-stage trial had
not been previously adjudicated and thus should have been dealt with
more extensively by the court. The polling procedure gives each juror
the opportunity to dissent from the verdict to which he had previously
agreed. A denial of this opportunity may therefore cause the verdict
to be recorded in the minutes of the court 8 3 without specific confirmation. In view of the procedure employed in Pickering, the damages
issue would be tried only after the liability verdict was recorded. By
denying defendants' request to have the jury polled at the conclusion
of the liability phase of the proceedings, the trial court did not give
due recognition to the possible implications of its denial. If the jury
had not confirmed the first verdict upon being polled, the question
of liability would have to have been reconsidered, no entry in the
court's records could have been made, and the need for proceeding
with the second phase of the trial would have been obviated.
Moreover, the second department failed to consider the primary
purpose of the polling procedure -to make certain that each juror
actually agrees with the pronounced verdict and that no coercion has
taken place in the jury room. 8 4 It would seem that a juror who has
been coerced into acquiescing in a verdict would be less likely to disclose the coercion several days after it has occurred. In addition, once
the damages phase had begun, the defendants' liability for such damages would likely have become conclusively fixed in the jurors' minds.
Accordingly, it would have been proper to confirm the liability verdict
immediately after it was rendered and not several days thereafter.
ARTICLE 52-ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5201: Constitutionalityof Seider v. Roth reluctantly upheld by
divided fededral court.
The recently added subdivision (1) in CPLR 320(c) provides that
"an appearance is not equivalent to personal service upon the defendant . . . if jurisdiction is based solely upon a levy on defendant's
property within the state pursuant to an order of attachment."
This amendment to CPLR 320 was necessitated by the widely
criticized Seider v. Roth8 5 doctrine authorizing a New York plaintiff
183 See CPLR 4112.
184 It has been stated that the object of the poll is to "ascertain with certainty
that no one has been coerced or induced to agree to a verdict to which he does not
actually assent." Brith Trumpeldor of America, Inc. v. Bermil Sales & Serv. Co., 16 Misc.
2d 186, 174 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), modified, 17 Misc. 2d
206, 183 N.Y.S.2d 887 (App. T. Ist Dep't 1959).
185 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.YS.2d 99 (1966).
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injured in a fQreign jurisdiction to attach a nonresident defendant's
liability insurance policy, if issued by an insurer doing business in
New York. By allowing a Seider defendant the right to a limited appearance, and thereby eliminating any concern that he would feel
compelled to default rather than risk personal liability beyond the
value of his insurance coverage, the New York legislature has answered
what was perhaps the most valid criticism of the Seider attachment.
The significance of this legislation is negligible, however, since it is
merely a codification of a New York Court of Appeals ruling. 06 Of
greater significance is the fact that the legislature, while recognizing
that many other difficulties have been created by Seider, left the resolution of these problems to the courtslsT Three such problems center
around collateral estoppel, due process, and an insurer's disclaimer
should the defendant elect to default.
CollateralEstoppel:
With the addition of subdivision (1) to CPLR 320(c), a Seider
defendant need no longer fear personal liability beyond the value of
his insurance coverage if he defends on the merits. However, what
would be the result in a situation wherein a plaintiff, having prevailed
in a New York Seider action, later brings suit for the unsatisfied balance of his damages in a forum having in personam jurisdiction over
the defendant? Although the adjudication under the auspices of the
Seider attachment would have been limited as to the amount of
damages available to the plaintiff, it would nevertheless have fully
determined the defendant's liability. Under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, a subsequent in personam action by the plaintiff would apparently be restricted to a determination of the damages he sustained
beyond the amount awarded in the previous Seider action. Thus, the
defendant would be theoretically barred from raising any defenses to
his alleged misfeasance because the New York adjudication would be
deemed to have previously determined his liability. The nonresident
would therefore seemingly be compelled to defend the original quasi
in rem action, regardless of any burden, or be thereafter estopped from
contesting his alleged negligence.
Due Process:
A basic criticism of the Seider procedure concerns the burden
imposed on a nonresident forced to defend a tort action in a distant
186 Simpson v. Loehman, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.EZ2d 669, 287 NYS.2d 633 (1967),
reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E2d 317, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
187 See Bm. D 's CPLR 320, at 3-15 (Pamphlet ed. 1969).
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state merely because his insurer has chosen to do business in that forum.
In view of the fact that modern concepts of jurisdiction are based
upon "minimum contacts" with the forum state and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"'188 the exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction over a Seider defendant would appear to be based upon
tenuous grounds. The juridical situs of an intangible, such as the
insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify his insured, is a legal
fiction. The selection of the situs of property is traditionally based
upon the requirements of justice and convenience, in keeping with
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 9 One must question whether the establishment of New York as the situs of a debt, by
means of the Seider procedure, is consistent with these traditional
requirements.
Insurer's disclaimer should defendant elect to default:
In addition to the expenses and inconvenience imposed upon a
Seider defendant, if he chooses to default rather than tolerate these
burdens, he is confronted with section 167 of the Insurance Law.1 9 0

Under this provision the insurer can disclaim liability if he can show a
failure to cooperate on the part of his insured. Therefore, if a Seider
defendant allows judgment to be entered upon his default, could not
the insurer withdraw, and successfully assert lack of cooperation in
any action brought against him?
Minichiello v. Rosenberg,'9' decided by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Cricuit, involved virtually the same facts as Seider v. Roth.
Although the Minichiello court called for a reexamination of Seider,
it specifically answered the foregoing questions in upholding the constitutionality of that decision. Although recognizing the right of a
Seider defendant to defend the attachment without subjecting himself
to in personam jurisdiction, the court found it necessary to deal with
the contention that a later suit brought by the plaintiff for the unsatisfied balance of his demands would be decided against the defendant
under the theory of collateral estoppel. This contention was refuted
by interpreting a Seider action as "in effect a direct action against the
insurer."' 92 Therefore, the court reasoned that since the insured would
188 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
189 Severnol Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123, 174 N.E.
299, 300 (1931).
190 N.Y. INS. LAw § 167 (McKinney 1966).
191410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, - U.S. - (1969).
192410 F.2d at 112.
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not have been the true defendant in a Seider action, no state could
constitutionally give collateral estoppel effect to a Seider judgment.
The allegation that an attachment under Seider is violative of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was answered in
Minichiello upon en banc reconsideration. The basis for rehearing
was the defendant's contention that the court failed to give adequate
attention to the burden imposed on a nonresident forced to defend
a tort action in a distant state merely because his insurer has chosen
to transact business in that forum. The Second Circuit again upheld
the constitutionality of Seider in this respect, placing heavy reliance on
the landmark case of Harris v. Balk.193
Harris involved what would today be an attachment of a debt
under CPLR 5201(a). The defendant, a resident of North Carolina,
was forced to defend the action in Maryland, simply because his debtor
had been present in that state. Since the debt was said to follow the
debtor, the attachment was held valid. In applying this rule, the
Minichiello court reasoned that a Harris defendant had no more control over the whereabouts of his debtor than a Seider defendant has over
the business transactions of his insurance company. As long as Harris
stands, said the court, no unfair burden can be found to be imposed
on a Seider defendant. Although not specifically noted by the court, it
is apparent that under the Harris rule the requirement of due process
is less stringent for the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction than for
jurisdiction in personam.
The Minichiello court next responded to criticism that the insurer
would be able to resist liability on the basis of the insured's noncooperation, should the defendant choose to default. Any potential
problems in this regard were obviated by the court's holding that a
breach of the insured's obligation to cooperate would merely relieve
the insurer of liability under the Seider attachment. In any subsequent
action, he would again be liable to defend and indemnify his insured.
Despite the fact that Minichiello has adequately disposed of
several objections to the continued viability of the Seider procedure,
the most interesting, and perhaps the most significant aspect of the
Second Circuit's decision was set forth in the majority's conclusion
upon rehearing:
[W]e are not required to decide whether Seider might produce
constitutionally impermissible results if applied so as to prefer one
claimant over another in cases of multiple claims where the
193 198 US. 215 (1905).
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damages exceed the policy limits and the insured is without funds
to pay the excess. We would hope that realization of the complexities of such problems and the considerations urged in our
brother ANDERSON'S dissent might stimulate the reexamination
of Seider... .194

Thus, while sustaining the constitutionality of the Seider doctrine,
the Minichiello court has joined the ranks of those who criticize the
decision because of the myriad of problems it has created. 95
CPLR 5234: Stipulation between parties incorporated in court order
is held to be insufficient to establish priority of creditor.
Priority among judgment creditors is determined by CPLR 5234(c)
where the attached res is in the possession of a third party, and, generally speaking, priority is obtained by the creditor who files his court
order first. However, a creditor's judgment will not be deemed prior
unless he obtains a turnover order 9 6 pursuant to either CPLR 5227 or
CPLR 5225(b) directing a third party indebted to the judgment
debtor, 9 7 or holding money or property belonging to the debtor, 98
to pay what is owed, or so much of it as will satisfy the judgment, to
the judgment creditor. The procurement and service of a restraining
order, or any other steps taken by the creditor, no matter how diligent,
1 99
are insufficient in themselves to qualify for priority.
A question of priority between judgment creditors arose in Cook
v. H.R.H. Construction Corp.,200 wherein the plaintiff (Cook) sought
an adjudication declaring his claim against funds held by defendant
H.R.H. Construction Corporation (H.R.H.) to be superior to the claim
of defendant-creditor Goldman.
On August 12, 1966, Cook had served a restraining notice on
H.R.H. with respect to property in which Grunwald, the plaintiff's
judgment debtor, and Grunwald's business concern, conducted under
the name of Shur-Fit Metal Products Corporation (hereinafter ShurFit), had an interest. H.R.H. moved for an order vacating the restraining notice, and Cook, in opposition to that motion, moved for a turnover order. Before the court ruled on these motions, however, the
194410 F.2d at 119.
195 See, e.g., 7B MOKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary 18 (1965-69).
196 As used in the present discussion, a "turnover order" is an order to deliver or
pay the property or money, or an order to transfer such, to a receiver. See 6 WK&M
5234.17 (1969).
197 CPLR 5227,
198 CPLR 5225(b).
199 City of New York v. Panzirer, 23 App. Div. 2d 158, 259 N.YS.2d 284 (1st Dep't
1965).
200 32 App. Div. 2d 806, 302 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1969).

